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Copyright Policy and the Problem of Generalizing 
Eva E. Subotnik* 
INTRODUCTION 
Today we have heard a variety of concerns expressed by professional authors, 
artists and performers.  But one of the toughest aspects of determining how to make 
the copyright system work better is generalizing about what is and is not working.  
In these brief remarks, I would like to identify three areas that demonstrate this 
difficulty. 
At the outset, a disclaimer:  I took the animating theme of this Symposium to be 
the improvement of the financial stake of individual authors in some kind of direct 
way.  This mode of analysis should be distinguished from other approaches, 
equally valid, that would seek out ways of benefitting individual creators by 
improving the financial position of Hollywood studios, record labels, publishers 
and the like.  With that assumption stated, here are the three contexts that reflect the 
difficulty in generalizing:  (1) the issue of identifying the kinds of creative activity 
that should properly be the focus of the copyright system; (2) the issue of 
evaluating copyright law’s application to the Internet, which is both a catalyst for 
and detractor from profitable authorship; and (3) the issue of framing the costs of 
enforcing copyright interests. 
I.  GENERALIZING ABOUT “AUTHORSHIP” 
Situations arise from time to time that raise the question of who is an “author” to 
begin with—a term that the Copyright Act does not define.1  There has been much 
fanfare over whether monkeys can be authors.2  But leaving that issue aside, there 
is arguably some inconsistency over who is an “author” and, by extension, who 
should benefit financially from the copyright system.  So, for example, one 
appellate court refused to find authorship in a wildflower display created by an 
artist, Chapman Kelley, in Chicago’s Grant Park.3  Acknowledging that Kelley had 
selected his species of flowers for “aesthetic” reasons, that the defendant had 
actually marketed the display as “living landscape art,” and that Kelley’s garden 
could be classified “as a work of postmodern conceptual art,”4 the court 
nevertheless found the garden to be too much a product of natural forces—which 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 2. See COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §§ 306, 313.2 (3d ed. 2014). 
 3. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 4. Id. at 293, 304. 
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distinguished it, the court suggested, from a work like Jeff Koons’ Puppy.5 
Now perhaps this one failed authorship bid need not trouble us; indeed, the 
thrust of the case seemed to be about artistic control of the garden’s future rather 
than securing financial rewards for the artist.  Furthermore, it would be wrong to 
infer a trend toward denying authorship claims.  Another appellate court, for 
example, recently found likely protectable authorship in a brief acting performance 
by an aspiring actress, Cindy Lee Garcia.6  Her actor-ly rendering of four pages of 
script was at least a minimal “creative contribution” to the underlying film.7  
Accordingly, the Garcia decision might make those in favor of ensuring financial 
rewards sanguine by signaling a broad opening for a new class of viable authorship 
claims. 
And yet, such an open-ended, capacious approach to authorship is not 
necessarily a victory for the interests of professional authors.  The Garcia case had 
nothing to do with the enforcement of copyright as a legal tool to ensure a creative 
livelihood.  Furthermore, the Garcia court fell into the same formalistic approach 
to assessing authorship as did the Kelley court—both avoiding the question of 
whether these plaintiffs were creative professionals who were likely to have been 
motivated by the copyright regime in undertaking their respective creative 
activities.  Moreover, the court in the Garcia case did not fully appreciate the 
practical consequences of expanding authorship:  that in the future, such expansion 
may come at the particular expense of small-budget directors and producers—that 
is, those who do typically rely on copyright—who must now be concerned about 
preventing fractured copyright claims to their films.8 
In short, when the questions of “Who is an author?” or “What is an act of 
authorship?” become untethered from the overarching goals of copyright, it 
becomes harder to shape law and policy toward assisting that subset of creators 
who actually rely on copyright to make—or to supplement—a living.9 
II.  GENERALIZING ABOUT COPYRIGHT LAW’S APPLICATION TO 
THE INTERNET 
Congress established the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), in part, to 
encourage the architecture that would permit the robust growth of online-
 
 5. Id. at 305–06. 
 6. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014).  The Ninth Circuit granted an en banc 
rehearing on November 12, 2014.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).  The oral 
argument took place on December 15, 2014, and the decision was pending at the time this Article went 
to print.  See Status of En Banc Cases, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Mar. 27, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/5J8R-LNB6. 
 7. See Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933–34. 
 8. See, e.g., Brief for Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 9–10, Garcia, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). 
 9. Analogous concerns about protecting the relevant class of creators have led to the 
development of heightened judicial scrutiny—above what the statute itself requires—of those claiming 
co-author status.  See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomson v. 
Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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distributed content.10  And, in point of fact, many creators today clearly benefit a 
great deal from the visibility and word-of-mouth publicity they can achieve that 
would not have been possible in an earlier day.  In particular, it means that 
individual authors can market themselves without the help of a gatekeeping 
distributor who would otherwise be exerting creative control as well as taking a 
portion of the profits.11 
And yet, it is clear that the role of the Internet as a business platform for 
individual authors is a mixed blessing—a lesson that is frequently lost amidst the 
prominent cases that have litigated the DMCA’s provisions.  Many of those cases 
involve corporate copyright owners suing Internet service providers (ISPs) of 
various sizes.12  Thus, the kinds of assumptions that emerge—such as the 
expectation that copyright owners can readily file thousands upon thousands of 
takedown notices with ISPs—may reflect the most efficient arrangement in view of 
the resources that larger copyright owners have to monitor their works.  Likewise, 
judicial interpretations that have gained traction, such as the requirement that ISPs 
know or be aware of “specific instances of infringement” before they become 
disqualified from safe harbor protection,13 are understandable where the aggrieved 
party has the resources to regularly notify the ISP of specific infringement. 
But the burden allocation among authors, ISPs and users starts to look a little 
different when the relevant copyright owner is an individual author.  For smaller-
operation creators, the ability to spend hours per day submitting takedown notices 
is simply not feasible.14  Moreover, there is a tipping point:  such a use of time 
becomes counter-productive with respect to copyright policy when it deprives the 
author of resources he would otherwise be using to create new works, which is of 
course the point of the copyright system in the first place.15 
Furthermore, it is tempting—but often imprecise—to generalize about the main 
types of uses that copyright owners are unhappy about:  either direct 
commercialization by the service provider itself (driving ad revenues from which it 
benefits, for example), or non-commercial uses by those who merely want to 
consume media on a personal level or express their tastes and creative remixes with 
members of the community. 
 
 10. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50 (1998). 
 11. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 152 (2008) (“Any studio, 
label, publisher, or, most important, individual author can make a work available to a global audience 
simply by posting it on a Web site or releasing it onto a peer-to-peer network. . . . The economics of 
digital distribution, in short, would seem to dictate a highly competitive, decentralized sector for 
producing and disseminating creative works.”). 
 12. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 13. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30–31; see also UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1021. 
 14. See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, 
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 56 (2013) [hereinafter INTERNET POLICY 
TASK FORCE GREEN PAPER]. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
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This is because authors have found that uses of their works fall into yet a third 
category:  commercial uses by corporate entities that discover the authors’ works 
on the Internet and proceed to exploit them out in the brick-and-mortar world.  As 
one photographer, who specializes in high-quality photographs of insects, recently 
put it: 
[L]et me indulge in a list of recent venues where commercial interests have used my 
work without permission, payment, or even a simple credit:  Billboards, YouTube 
commercials, pesticide spray labels, website banners, exterminator trucks, t-shirts, 
iPhone cases, stickers, company logos, eBook covers, trading cards, board games, 
video game graphics, children’s books, novel covers, app graphics, alt[ernative]-
med[icine] dietary supplement labels, press releases, pest control advertisements, 
crowdfunding promo videos, coupons, fliers, newspaper articles, postage stamps, 
advertisements for pet ants (yes, that’s a thing), canned food packaging, ant bait 
product labels, stock photography libraries, and greeting cards.16 
At a deeper level, attempts to generalize about the role of the Internet in 
supporting, and hampering, creative livelihoods touch on larger problems of 
generalizing about the nature of infringement today.  In a number of instances, 
high-profile lawsuits by individual creators have been directed at uses of their 
works by other individual creators—cases such as Cariou v. Prince17 or Salinger v. 
Colting.18  These cases get much press, in part, because the facts are easy to 
describe and the cases raise colorful and important questions about how the 
copyright system should apply when the issue is the creative needs of author v. 
author.  But those high-profile contests can mask the fact that much litigation by 
individual authors is, in fact, directed squarely at straightforward commercial use—
often bread and butter stuff, such as use beyond the terms of a license.19 
III.  GENERALIZING ABOUT THE COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT 
There is a real imbalance in perceptions about the costs of enforcing copyrights.  
Those genuinely and rightly concerned about the expansion of copyright point out 
how unpredictable it can be to gauge the sorts of uses that will elicit a cease-and-
desist letter from an aggrieved copyright owner.20  From another perspective, most 
individual authors cannot credibly threaten a lawsuit:  indeed, the Copyright Office 
has recently cited statistics estimating that “the median cost for a party to litigate a 
copyright infringement lawsuit with less than $1 million at stake through appeal is 
$350,000.”21  So, in a sense we find ourselves at a standstill in which it is once 
 
 16. Alex Wild, Bugging Out:  How Rampant Online Piracy Squashed One Insect Photographer, 
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 24, 2014), http://perma.cc/D974-LBZ2. 
 17. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 18. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 19. See, e.g., Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2014); Beasley v. John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 12 C 8715, 2014 WL 3600519 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2014). 
 20. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX:  MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 108 (2008). 
 21. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS 25 (2013), available at 
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again difficult to generalize—copyright litigation is, on the one hand, ready to leap 
out and crush expressive reuse at any moment and, on the other hand, totally out of 
reach for the ordinary author. 
From either perspective, current enforcement mechanisms are hardly acting as 
an optimal tool for ensuring reasonable compensation for authors.  Furthermore, the 
notion that one can parlay litigation, at the very least, into profitable name 
recognition within the wider artistic community (as Patrick Cariou likely did by the 
end22), is for most authors wishful thinking. 
IV.  WHAT LESSONS CAN WE DRAW? 
Unfortunately, I am afraid that I have primarily succeeded in raising questions 
about, rather than law-driven solutions to, how to help professional authors 
monetize their creative works.  But the main thing I have tried to underscore is that 
a one-size-fits-all approach to copyright does not seem to serve the cause of 
individual professional authors.  In that regard, legal initiatives that assist in 
differentiating among categories of authors and owners may be useful. 
One example of this is the possibility of a small claims tribunal, as the 
Copyright Office has recently proposed.23  Additional examples are the tailoring of 
burden allocations under the DMCA,24 or the elimination of the requirement of 
timely registration for eligibility for statutory damages,25 with respect to certain 
kinds of authors or owners.  It is to these sorts of initiatives that we should turn our 
attention if we want to help professional authors going forward. 
 
http://perma.cc/M8CZ-RGAL [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT]. 
 22. See generally Cariou, 714 F.3d 694. 
 23. See generally COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 21. 
 24. See, e.g., INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE GREEN PAPER, supra note 14, at 58. 
 25. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 21, at 112; see also id. at 22; Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law:  A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454 (2009) (“Because individual authors and small firms do not typically 
register their copyrights within three months of publication, they rarely qualify for statutory damages or 
attorney’s fee awards.”). 
